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3The Third Reich
The twelve years of the National Socialist Third Reich have received
more scholarly attention than any other period of similar duration for
the obvious reasons of the brutality of the regime, its novelty, its
instigation of the Second World War and above all the Holocaust.
Those same features have made the interpretation of the regime
especially problematic and contentious. The facts that an explicit
constitution was never written and that an authorised ideology was
never sanctioned have hampered the efforts of later commentators, as
they did the efforts of theorists supportive of the regime at the time,
to make sense of what the regime actually was. This lack of explicit
central direction was recognised by a National Socialist official, who
noted that often people waited in vain for instructions on how to act:
Unforrunately, rhe same will be true in the furure; but in facr it is the dury
of everybody ro rry to work rowards the Fuhrer along the lines he would
wish. Anyone who makes mistakes will notice it soon enough. Bur anyone
who really works towards the Fuhrer along his lines and rowards his goal
will cerrainly both now and in the future one day have the finest reward in
the form of the sudden legal confirmation of his work. I
In terms of the broader issues of political theory, the nature of the
state, law, admirustration and the international order, this prescrip-
tion captured the uncertainty which theorists were faced with but
erred in suggesting that they would ever find final confirmation of
their views.
While some older theorists who were hostile or unsympathetic to
the regime, such as Smend, Anschutz and Thoma, wrote little or
avoided the central political issues, younger ambitious men rushed to
fill the gap, often taking the POStS of those who had been driven into
exile or retirement. They vied to demonstrate their commitment to the
regime, and many engaged in personal conspiracies in order to
discredit their competitors. This was accomparued by an inflationary
use of what was taken to be appropriate vocabulary that induced the
National Socialist juriSt Gottfried Neesze to complain of 'speechifying
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and enthusiasm abour blood and earth, race, honour, communiry,
Yolk' behind which lay the old concepts of constitutional theory.2
Neesze's point, of course, was that this new vocabulary had to be
taken more seriously and the break with the past had to be captured in
the conceptS of constitutional theory. In Neesze's mind, failure to do
so could amount to 'sabotage', a charge he did not hesitate to level at
Otto Koellreutter despite the fact that Koellreutter was one of the few
eStablished jurists to commit himself openly to the National Socialist
parry before the seizure of power.3
The sense of a break with the past and of a renewal of German
spirir and energy was widespread. The break with the past meant in
the first place a break with Weimar. For hiStorians especially, that
could mean the supposed reassertion of a link with the Prussian and
imperial tradition that had been severed in 1918. Younger historians,
however, were more inclined to see the kleindeutsch solution of
Bismarck as insufficiently ambitious.4 For many historians and legal
theorists, the revolutionary transition represented by the advent of
the Third Reich signified a break with the entire liberal eta. From this
perspecrive, the German Reich that collapsed in 1918, together with
the theories it spawned, was recast as liberal in spirit and principle,
or at beSt as a beleaguered 'soldiers' state' that was crippled by its
concessions to the civilians.s The idea of narional renewal and rhe
end of a liberal era came together in rhe supposition that Germany
was embarking on a new, distinCtively German political path. Here,
the old liberal models were no guide. Even the once-favoured
Allgemeine Staatslehre was consigned to the past. Carl Schmitt
dismissed this 'category' as a 'rypical concern of the liberal nineteenth
century'6 The very word allgemein (general) suggested a form of
State of universal validiry. That was incompatible with the idea that
the National Socialist State was distinCtive and distinctively German.
There was nat even any attempt to formulate a comparative theory
or model of fasciSt states?
The realiry of the Third Reich was itself a paradox of the perceived
omnipresence of the state and what the historian Michael Geyer has
described as an 'extreme dilUtion of domination into an endless series
of partial statelike organisations'.s It was, according to Geyer,
a state consisting of public acrors - some of them were legally 'private' like
industries, some belonged ro the executive like the military, and some were
altogether hybrid mixtures like the German Labour Front - which gained
their autonomy from their ability to coerce and ro gain independent access
to resources.9
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Here, it was not the convergence of these competing actors that
allowed the system to function but the distance between them. It
was this realiry that also allowed political theorists to pick up different
aspects of the system even if they were sometimes frustrated by the
ambiguiry of the 'hybrid mixtures' within the Third Reich.
It was rare for the confusion to be identified as bluntly as it was by
the State Secretary of the Interior, Wilhelm Stuckart: 'inflation of
administrative authorities, war berween administrative authorities,
duplication of work and idleness of administrative authorities ...
reduction of legal securiry through the increased possibiliry of
mutually conflicting administrative decisions', all of which threatened
the most valuable asset 'that a state possesses, namely the trust of
the people'. 10 Nevertheless, Stuckart effectively acknowledged that the
disintegration of any coherent order was far from confined to the
National Socialist movement, that is, to the realm of the Parry and its
numerous affiliated organisations.
The pace of change, economic recovery and rearmament, anti-
semitic persecution, the hollowing-out of the legal system by the
security apparatus, increased if erratic state intervention in the econ-
omy, and above all expansion and war all forced theorists to attempt
to grasp the nature of the regime in the light of the most recent
developments. The union with Austria in 1938, in whose authoritar-
ian constitution of 1934 some had seen the only alternative to
National Socialism, the occupation of the Czech lands in 1939,
and the occupation of most of Europe in the Second World War
opened up new problems and perspectives that further challenged the
viability of traditional concepts. Moreover, responsiveness to the
dynamics and the complexity of the Third Reich had to be combined
with assertions of the unity of the Third Reich - for it was unity that
supposedly, if erroneously, distinguished it from the despised liberal
order of the past.
The state
Otto Koellreutter made an early attempt to define the new state under
the heading 'Der nationale Rechtsstaat' (The national Rechtsstaat).
He specified that the realisation of this form of state did not entail a
'change of the form of the state', but what he meant by that was simply
that a restoration of the monarchy was not possible. The new national
Rechtsstaat is, he argued, different by virtue of the political idea that
animates it. The elemental power of this new 'political substance' is
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evident in the ease with which it has swept aside the autonomy of the
states within the Reich. Despite this emphasis upon radical change,
Koellreutter clearly wanted to retain some characteristics of tradi-
tional approach insofar as he wanted to retain the autonomy of the
civil service. He wrote that there has to be a 'clear separation of
the political leadership as the representative of political value and the
professional civil service as the representative of the legal value .. .' 11
It was Koellreutter's desire to retain the concept of the Rechtsstaat
at all that induced Neesse's suspicions, though the number of those
who wished to retain the concept in one guise or another was quite
substantial. 12 Gustav Adolf Walz accepted that the concept was
relevant to what he saw as the regime's commitment to justice and
because general binding norms enunciated in legislation would still be
required; but that did not warrant using the term Rechtsstaat as a
general characterisation of the regime, for that would amount to
confusing the means that the regime might employ with its essence. 13
Walz also considered the term 'authoritarian state'. That was
favoured by Schmitt's pupil Herbert Kruger as well. For Kruger,
'the authoritarian state principle is the constitution of the National
Socialist state'.14 Walz, however, was not convinced. He argued that
the concept of the authoritarian state had specific, recent political
connotations, namely reliance on presidential power as enshrined in
the Weimar constitution and a reformulation of the basic rights
enshrined in the second part of the Weimar constitution. IS The
underlying political point was that the concept of the authoritarian
state conjured up the viewpoint of those who had sought to establish
an authoritarian alternative to both the democratic order of Weimar
and to the National Socialists. Walz was little more sympathetic to the
idea that the new regime should be characterised as a corporatist state.
That was favoured by many who bad long looked on the idea of a
corporatist state, often as represented by fascist Italy, as an alternative
to the Weimar Republic. Yet even Werner Sombart, who also
favoured this idea, had to concede that it was at best only partially
applicable to the new Germany. Of the various functions origin-
ally performed by the estates, the cultivation of a specific mentality
among their members, the confi.rmation of non-egalitarian principles
through the conferment of privileges, and educational, economic and
political state functions, only fragments of the functional tasks of
the estates could be revived, and even these only for segments of the
population. 16
Walz's preferred designation was the 'volkischer Fiihrerstaat',
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which he claimed captured the distinctive national identity and sense
of unity in the new state as well as the concentration of executive and
legislative power in the leader, who was the leader of the Reich, the
Yolk and the partyP Ernst Forsthoff, another protege of Schmitt,
showed some reservations about relying so heavily on the idea of
leadership. Leadership, he argued, is bound up with the personal
qualities of the leader and the leader's ties to his followers. But such
qualities and ties are transient in that they do not endure beyond the
life of the leader. It is acceptable, he continued, that a movement held
[Ogether by leadership can dissolve with the death of the leader; but
this is not acceptable for the state, which is 'the form of the political
existence of a people'.'8 Walz also complained that there was some-
thing 'unmetaphysical' in the personal qualities of the leader. The
desired metaphysical principle remained somewhat elusive, though it
is clear that what Walz meant by this was some ideology of a quasi-
religious nature that provided an unquestionable sanction for the
authority of the '[Otal state', that is, the state that swept away the
liberal Rechtsstaat with its reliance on law and the distinction between
state and society. In seeking to explain what he meant by '[Otal state',
Forsthoff had [0 combine the general antipathy to formal bureau-
cracies - though he insisted that some element of bureaucratically
guaranteed calculability is necessary - and the idea of a form of
authority that entailed personal responsibility and personal power of
command. He found this in the figure of the Reichsstatthalter, that is,
the position of Reich Governor created by the new reginle [0 co-
ordinate the states of the Reich. Several years later, Arnold Kbttgen
argued that these political commissars had been a transitional pheno-
menon whose role and whose distinctiveness from the civil service had
subsequently faded. 19 Kbttgen was arguably right about the Reich
Governors, though Forsthoff had picked up Hitler's inclination to use
special authorities or commissars to circumvent the crises [0 which the
regime was prone as well as to promote his racist and anti-semitic
visions. The fact mat Kbttgen and Forsthoff were each partially right
is bound up with the difficulty that each had in tesponding to an ever-
changing teality whose ultimate destination could not be defined.
Schmitt made one of the most enduring attempts to capture this
dynamic under the title Staat, Bewegung, Yolk (State, Movement,
People).2o He claimed that each term could be used to express the
'political unity' of the new order but also to capture a specific side of it:
'the state in the narrower sense as the political-static parr, the move-
ment as the political-dynamic element and the Yolk as the unpolitical
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side, thriving under the protection and shadow of the political
decisions .. .'21 Having set up a tripartite framework, Schmitt then
argued that unity is established insofar as the movement 'presses
through and leads' the state and the VolkP While clearly legitimating
the leading role claimed by the Nazi movement as a whole, Schmitt
also claimed that the interaction of these elements under the guiding
role of the movement provides an alternative to the dualistic concep-
tions typical of the liberal democratic order which counterposes state
and Volk, government and Volk, citizen and civil servant, or state and
parry.23 Schmitt still thought it necessary to warn against allowing
these political decisions in the new order to become subject to the
courts, for the equality of the contending parties inherent in due legal
process might allow the 'open or concealed enemy of the new state' to
put itself on the same level as the state or the movement.24
Reinhard Hahn had been encouraged by Schmitt but soon became a
bitter rival. He constantly harried those whom he suspected, rightly or
wrongly, of less-than-wholehearted commitment to the new order. Yet
he agreed with Schmitt on the dangers of subjecting the state and
movement to due legal process and rurned this into a broader attack
upon the 'juristic State personality, the "foundation and corner stOne"
of previous constitutional law... .'25 In a survey of the development
of German constitutional thought, Georg ]ellinek emerged as Hahn's
main target. ]ellinek, Hahn complained, had c1issolved all human
relations into relations between individual personalities. While other
theorists had hesitated to reduce the state to the same level and had
tended to deny the state's subjects 'subjective-public' rights against the
state, ]ellinek had construed the state as an 'abstract state personality'
precisely in order to make such rights possible: 'In order to be able to
give the individual subjective public rights, he had to place the state, as
much as is possible, on the same level with the personality of the
individual' .26 For Hahn, breaking the hold of this concept of the state
was the major challenge and achievement of the political thought of
the new order: 'The foundation and corner stone of constitutional law
is no longer the legal person of the state; rather the national com-
munity is the new statting point ... The state as a legal person and the
concept of the community are mutually exclusive' .27
Hahn's arrack on the idea of the personality of the state was widely
applauded. Neesze described it as Hahn's 'undisputable service'.28
Yet the wider implications of Hahn's assault on the concept of the
state were contested. Ernst Rudolf Huber, for example, described
the replacement of the concept of the personality by that of the
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community as the teplacement of one abstract concept by another.
Huber regarded the concept of community as important but argued
that its indiscriminate use would merely undermine its true value.29 ln
his Verfassungsrecht des Grossdeutschen Reiches (Constitutional Law
of the Greater German Reich) of 1939, the most substantial work of
its kind in the Third Reich, Huber mounted a cautious defence of the
concept of the state. He had to defer to Hitler's repeated insistence that
the state is an instrument and not a purpose in its own right, but he
claimed that this did not require dispensing with the concept of the
state or degrading it to the name of a 'dead apparatus'. Huber found
an answer to his difficulty in distinguishing between the state in a
narrower sense, as an administrative and military organisation, and
the state in a wider sense as the totality of the national order, as a
'living organism'. He then suggested that the former might be desig-
nated as 'state organisation' and the latter as the Reich.3o
While Huber deployed the concept of the Reich in order to salvage
the concept of the state, two years later Schmitt produced a brief
article with the title 'Staat als ein konkreter, an eine geschichtliche
Epoche gebundener Begriff' (The state as a concrete concept, bound to
an historical epoch). He discussed the origins of the concepts of state
and sovereignty in the sixteenth century bur made clear that the era in
which the state was the general organisational political form was
coming to an end. Equally significant was his claim: 'The German
Yolk also had to go through the narrow pass of state sovereignty
before it was possible for a new German Reich to win back for
Germany leadership in Europe'.3l
The initial attemprs to grasp the nature of the new regime were
followed by mounting attacks on old concepts mixed with defensive
attempts to cling on to at least some of the old connotations of
the state while adapting to the regime. The more ambitious, both
personally and intellectually, staked everything on National Socialist
victory.
The concept of politics: leadership contra administration
Long-standing concern with political leadership combined with Na-
tional Socialisr veneration of the Fuhrer to give it a central place in the
attitude to the concepr of politics in the Third Reich. in the case of
Schmitt, this continued to be related to his understanding of the
relationship of the political to the state. The assumption that the
political is bound up with the state presumes, he argued, that the state
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is the sole or normal form of political unity. This, however, he rejected
as being no longer the case on the grounds that the Volk is now the
normal form of political unity.32 Yet Schmitt also continued to claim
that the state has to be defined from the perspective of the political.33
Attempts to determine an objective sphere of politics, distinct from
economics, technology and religion or to separate out a non-political
social sphere, had all failed. Even apparently trivial matters such as the
music played during a military march could become highly political
issues. Schmitt concluded that this 'proves how much today a unified
political leadership capable of taking decisions is necessary for every
people, in order to preserve the primacy of the political decisions (the
primacy of politics) .. .'34
Schmitt sought to tie down this concept of political leadership by
distinguishing it from other activities to which he thought it might be
wrongly assimilated. Thus, political leadership has nothing to do with
legally constrained activity. It is to be distinguished from any kind of
'supervision' and above all from ideas of 'trusteeship' and 'education'.
He warned his readers that they must guard against the possibility
'that a specifically German and National Socialist concept [of political
leadership] is muddied and watered down by assimilation to alien
categories'.35 Schmitt then stated what this specifically German
and National Socialist concept was: 'rhe unconditional racial
identity [Artgleichheit] between the leader and the followers
[Gefolgschaft] .. .'36 Schmitt left no doubt that he meant racial
identity in the strict sense of the term. Referring to recent speeches
in which the idea of race [Rasse] had been central, he added that this
central role was 'no kind of theoretically conceived posrulate'.37
Huber referred to Schmitt approvingly in his treatment of the narure
of politics; but, despite having a similar focus upon leadership, the
emphasis is significantly different. Thus Huber invoked Schmitt's well-
known distinction between friend and enemy but asserted that this
was only one criterion and that politics was of no value in irself
without reference to a 'vital form, whose will, decision and act appear
in the political'.38 This is both close to Schmitt, insofar as it refers to a
'political unity', and somewhat distant from him, insofar as Huber
sought to sidestep the centrality of Schmitt's distinction between friend
and enemy. The real difference emerged, however, when Huber
claimed that the historical continuity of political will required a
'bearer' of this will that endured through contingency and transfor-
mations of history and that this 'bearer of politics is the state .. .'39
Huber's attempt to make the concept of the state central did not
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diminish his enthusiasm for the 'leadership srate' (Fiihrerstaat).
Indeed, Huber took the concept of sovereignty from the repertoire
of attributes of the state in order to hand it over to the leader in its
most unconstrained form, including 'originality, exclusivity and
universality, irresistibility .. .'40
It was not only constitutional theorists who defended the primacy of
politics and centrality of leadership. Helmut Schelsky and Arnold
Gehlen did so from the perspectives of the history of political thought
and philosophical anthropology. Schelsky sought to reclaim the
seventeenth-century English philosopher Thomas Hobbes from what
he saw was an individualistic and rationalistic misinterpretation. The
error, he argued, lies in confusing Hobbes's approach to the explana-
tion of the physical world, including the human body, with his
approach to the distinctive qualities of human nature, that is, speech.
Speech facilitates a certain distance from the environment by means of
a more proficient calculation, of which animals are not capable, and it
enables men to advise each other. It is, however, a third quality of
speech that Schelsky emphasised. It means that 'we can command
and understand commands'.41 Here lies the source of society, peace
and discipline. Speech not instinct is decisive. From this, Schelsky
concluded: 'The primacy of politics can scarcely be more clearly
developed already in the picture of man'.42 The total srate is rooted
in human nature. Gehlen also appealed to the distinctiveness of human
nature. For Gehlen, human nature is distinctive by virtue of human
deficiencies when compared with other species. Lacking the certainty
of instinct and the physiological adaptation to specific situations and
forms of behaviour, man is exposed to risks and suffers from a lack of
orientation in a way that other species are not. Yet this deficiency also
provides an opportunity, for man has the capacity to form himself.
Man is an object of discipline for himself. From this need for
discipline, Gehlen developed an abstract justification for leadership
which he then recoupled to the regime's racial agenda.43
While Schelsky and Gehlen deployed arguments about human
nature in order to assert the primacy of politics construed in terms
of leadership and discipline, Hans Peter Ipsen sought to identify the
nature of politics by a comparative analysis of acts of state which, as
such, were held to be beyond the remit of the judiciary, and hence
political. Ipsen's goal was to strip away any limitation on the acts of
those bodies that 'qualified', as he put it, as sovereign. Each such body,
whether the state or the party, can derermine for itself the specific cases
in which it acts that count as sovereign and hence as completely
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beyond judicial review. This does justice, he claimed, to the irration-
aliry of the political.44 An enumeration of such acts is neither possible
nor desirable, for it violates the very concept of sovereign acts. He
rejected even the legislative sanction of police powers beyond the
realm of the judiciary in the Third Reich as insufficient recognition of
the autonomy of the police.45 Ipsen was aware that this proliferation
of sovereign authorities was potentially problematic, hence his assur-
ance that 'The "separation of leadership and administration" make
the "dynamic element of leadership free" from the administrative
element, without thereby setting up contradictory competencies'.46
Despite this bland assurance, Ipsen conceded that some process of
accommodation (Ausgleich) would be necessary, though that in turn
was subordinated to political imperatives.47 Ipsen came close, in fact,
to giving expression to that 'extreme dilution of domination into an
endless series of partial state-like organisations' which characterised
the Third Reich, though he had to draw back from this conclusion in
the interests of the fa<;ade of uniry.
The distinction between leadership, or literally the leadership of
men (Menschenfuhrung), and administration (Verwaltung) was one of
the central themes and dilemmas of political thought in tbe Third
Reich. The assertion of the primacy of politics, understood as leader-
ship in contrast to administration, was one of the main themes of
political thougbt in the Third Reich. Again, Hohn adopted a con-
sciously radical position on the distinction between the two. He
specified that Hitler was leader (Fuhrer) of the movement and the
Volk and leader (Leiter) of the state, where the state is defined as an
apparatus of authorities and civil servants. Within the state, there is no
leadership but only command and obedience.48 This distinction
between leadership and administration was bound up with the idea
thar leadership is characterised by the voluntary submission of the
followers of the leader and that the leader either represents or forms
the Volk. The linkage with the movement was summatised in the
frequent assertion that 'leadership is the sole task of the movement'.49
Although no-one denied the importance of the principle of leader-
ship, Hohn's strict interpretation was not followed by all. Huber
sought to mitigate it by protesting about the inflationary use of the
term 'leader'. It is, he argued, particularly inappropriate in the
economic context.so Johannes Heckel, however, took exception to
Huber's extension of political leadership to the soldier, which, he
claimed, 'burdens the army with tasks and responsibilities which do
not correspond to its military profession .. .'51 Huber's extension of
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the leadership principle to the army, despite his protest against its
inflationary use elsewhere, followed from his opposition to the effec-
tive downgrading of the army and state implied by Hohn's restriction
of the leadership principle to the National Socialist movemenr. Huber
argued that all organisations, including the movement, require struc-
tures of command and obedience. At the same rime, the army and
administration are, he claimed, 'leadership orders which rest on
volunrary sacrifice, responsibiliry and faithfulness'.52
Despite and beqlUse of the high level of politicisation and the
sensitiviry of discussion of the general concept of the state, there
was what has been described as a 'rum towards administration' in the
political thought of the Third Reich.53 In part, this was a continuation
of the response to the reduction in the role played by the legislative
state that had already taken place in Weimar. It also seemed to offer
some minimal refuge from the pressures from the National Socialist
movement and the more radical political theorists. That meanr show-
ing that administration was not the mere administration of things bur
had some higher political digniry. This was what Forsthoff sought to
achieve under the slogan 'provision for existence' (Daseinsvorsorge).
He made clear that this is nor to be equated with 'welfare' (Fiir-
sorge).54 He argued, rather, that modern, urbanised mankind is
dependenr for its very existence upon the provision of services, like
the water and eleerriciry supply, that can no longer be guaranreed at
the level of the individual or family. What is at stake here is not how
men live, bur whether they will live at all. It is, he conrinued, these
administrative tasks that define the prime activiry of the modern state.
Forsthoff duly acknowledged Hohn's distinction between leadership
and administration but then promptly insisted that the administration
he had in mind is no mere mechanistic process. It is, rather, 'a
sovereign funcrion of great political dynamism'.55 Forsthoff also
sought to connect his vision of administration as 'provision for
existence' with the importance ascribed to the national communiry.
He claimed that the enhanced dependence on this form of state
administration is complemenred by a vital 'unreflective trust', for
without this 'feeling of being secure' there was a danger that the
national communiry would 'dissolve in panic-ridden visions'.56
Forsthoffs attempt to balance the claims of political leadership and
administration, in this case by enhancing the political profile of
administration, was but one of numerous attempts to discern and
legitimate some form of order amid the conflicting visions of the Third
Reich. It was no more successful than any of the others in ending the
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tension between the competing claims of leadership and administra-
tion. That tension became more problematic as National Socialist
rule extended over German Austrians and then over non-German
peoples. German administration over these peoples had an extent and
quality that did not seem to fit the narrow scope generally ascribed
to mere administration. Werner Best, who was to have extensive
practical experience of occupation in the service of the SS, finally
cut the Gordian knot by claiming that the word 'administration'
(Verwaltung) has its origins in a more comprehensive concept
of ruling (Walten). This concept of comprehensive rule had been
broken up and administration reduced to a subordinate activity
controlled by legislation and administrative courtS. In the light
of Germany's hegemonic position, however, all that had to be aban-
doned. Administration, according to Best, had to be understood
once again as comprehensive ruling, and the distinction between
'''political'' rule' and '''executive'' administration' had to be dis-
carded.57
Yolk, movement and law
The primacy of the Yolk was often presented as the unshakeable
foundation of German political unity compared to the transience of
the state. The endurance of the Yolk, the more or less explicitly quasi-
religious veneration of the Yolk, the comparative transience of the
state and the sense of threat to the unity of the Yolk, were common-
place elements of one stream of thought in the Third Reich. Although
the Yolk was supposedly the enduring foundation of unity, it was also
argued that the Yolk had only been assigned its rightful place in the
wake of the National Socialist revolution. Thus Hohn quoted
Laband's assertion that the German Reich established in 1871 could
not be understood as the creation of ever-increas.ing millions of
German citizens as evidence of the earlier inability to grasp the true
nature of the Volk.58 Similarly, he complained that when Jellinek
turned his gaze away from the juristically conceived state, all he saw
was 'simple chaos' .59 In contrast to these liberal conceptions, the Yolk
was presented as primary in the sense of directly incorporating the
individual members of the community. Indeed, the individual, that is,
the member of a society conceived as distinct from the state, equipped
with basic rights, was to be replaced by the concept of the 'national
comrade' (Volksgenosse) who had no need of such rights.6o Whereas
the liberal individual understood himself in contrast to the national
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community, the national comrade was supposed to be incorporated
within the communjty.
The attempt to present the Yolk as natural, substantive and
inclusive proved difficult to reconcile with other elements of the TlUrd
Reich and with the account of pre-National Socialisr Germany as
a record of fragmentation culminating in defeat and the Weimar
Republic. Unity, that is, the supposed reality of the national commu-
nity, had to be construed as both the product of Hitler and the
National Socialist movement, on the one hand, and as something
pre-existing on the other hand. This effectively left considerable scope
for significantly different emphases and mutual recrimination. Amid
the enthusiasm of the early days of the regime, Wilhelm Sauer could
proclaim rhat the Nordic racial type is no virtue per se, that race in
general is not a value in itself bur only a precondition and that the
Yolk is a mere natural organism.61 The need for some form of political
supplement to thjs natural substratum was summarised in Sauer's
slogan: 'the race [Yolk] is nature; the state is form; the nation [Nation]
is content, value, culture .. .'62 As Germany instigated the Second
World War, Huber also insisted that although race (Rosse) was the
natural foundation of the Yolk, an 'historical idea' or 'historical
mission' was required in order to form the 'political Yolk'. In doing
so, he felt obliged to rebut Hahn's accusation that in distinguishing
between the natural and the political Yolk he was tearing apart race
and hjstory.63 For Kriiger, Hitler was the source and creator of the
community. Kottgen agreed: 'The historical fact of a living national
community [Volksgemeinschaft] rests on the life and work of this
Fiihrer .. .' Yer he promptly added that this leadership had risen up
from the life of the Yolk and the movement.64 The circularity of the
argument is plain, but it provided some defence against the charge of
either underestimating Hitler's role or underestimating his roots in the
Yolk and the movement.
There was also some ambivalence about the role of the movement,
especially the National Socialist Party, though Schmitt's characterisa-
tion of the regime as a 'movement state' (Bewegungsstaat) was widely
adopted. The central difficulty concerned the relationship of the party
to the state. On the one hand, the unity of party and state was invoked,
both as a general principle and as a practice exemplified in Hitler's
position as head of state and leader and in the union of party and state
offices at a lower level. On the other hand, the distinction between
political leadership and administration, as well as a desire to emphasis
the difference between Germany and Italy, where the state was
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ascribed a more dominant role, pointed to an emphasis upon the
parallel existence of party and state. Thus, Ulrich Scheuner wrote of a
'characteristic duplication' of sovereign structures.65 Approaching the
relationship from the side of the party, Walter Sommer picked out
the fact that it had its own assets, administration, law and courts as
indicative of its autonomy. The Party, he proclaimed, has no need to
intervene in the state, for such intervention would only distract it from
its own tasks. Yet Sommer also noted that Hitler had warned that if
the state administration failed to fulfil key tasks, they would be
transferred to the Party.66 Sommer was tesponding to what in reality
was a fluid demarcation line that agencies of the Party could break
through, especially if prompted by even vague suggestions from
Hitler.
A similar ambivalence ran through attitudes towards the law. On
the one hand, there was a desire to discard what was seen as the
abstract, normative conception of law that was equated with the
liberal order in favour of a more substantive conception rooted in
the feelings of the unified community or the racial identity of the
German Volk. In the racial legal theory of Helmut Nicolai, race
defines the nature of law, the ability to judge particular cases and
the fact of the commission of a crime. Having discarded the idea of
free will in favour of a racial determinism, Nicolai saw the purpose
of law as deterrence in cases of minor infringement and as the
'elimination' of 'unhealthy' racial elements in more serious cases.67
Despite the anti-semitic rhetoric that recurs through his works in this
period, anti-semitism did not playa structural role in Schmitt's attempt
to redefine the nature of law. Schmitt asserted that there were only
three approaches to law, the first two of which he discarded, namely
normative and decisionistic approaches. Having earlier espoused
decisionism against normativism himself, he now chose to emphasise
the connection between the two. He picked out reliance upon general
abstract rules, the characteristic of normativist approaches, that were
nevertheless posited by men rather than existing independently of
human will, as the characteristic of the individualistic positivism of the
nineteenth century.68 That what is offered as objective and generally
valid is rooted in what is contingent and subjective, he now claimed,
reveals the inability of the positivist conception to provide any reliable
guidance. In place of these discredited options, Schmitt suggested that
the alternative lies in terms or thinking in terms of 'concrete orders'.
What Schmitt understood by this term is evident from his reference to
institutions such as 'marriage, family, estate, state', and to the idea
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that the terms employer, white-collar worker and blue-collar worker
were being replaced by the terms 'leaders and followers within a
factory', that is, that the liberal idea of a set of relationships, governed
by abstract general norms, into which individuals entered at their
discretion was to be replaced by the role they occupied within the
National Socialist community and the law peculiar to that role.69
On the other hand, this supposedly more 'concrete' order dissolved
into a fluid pattern as Schmitt pointed to the emergence of 'so-called
general clauses', that is, to general concepts of 'good ethics, faith and
belief', that could be attached to any law or judicial interpretation'?o
This, coupled with his explicit rejection of the Rechtsstaat understood
as a form of constitutional restraint, pointed towards Best's vision,
although Schmitt would personally clash with Best on several occa-
sions since Best was not convinced that Schmitt had sufficiently
accepted the importance of race in the new order.71 According to Best,
preventive police tasks of the political police have not found a legal
regulation. They cannOt find them, for the preventive police tasks of
the political police ... cannot be written down and given normative form
for all time. The tasks of the political police ... are not freely selected bur
prescribed by the enemy.72
A National Socialist theory of international law
Throughout the course of the Third Reich, attitudes towards the
international order were prescribed by the international enemy, in the
sense that German theorists held that Germany had been subordi-
nated to an alien and imperialist model of international law.
In part, they hoped that the principles of this enemy, which were
embodied in the Versailles Treaty and the Geneva-based League of
Nations, could be turned against this enemy. Just as they praised the
ability of rhe National Socialist movement to exploit what they saw
as the weaknesses of the Weimar Republic's liberal democracy in
order to overthrow it, so too they hoped to exploit the principled
equality of states in international law in order to enhance Germany's
posirion, and occasionally openly blurred this out.?3 The close
connection between internal enmity, the hostility towards Weimar,
and external enmity, towards Versailles and the League of Nations,
was evident in the title of a collecrion of essays by Schmitt, published
in 1940: Positionen und Begrif{e im Kampf mit Weimar-Genf-
Versailles 1923-1939 (Positions and Concepts in the Struggle with
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Weimar-Geneva-Versailles). Schmitt's illustration of the connections
evident in this struggle was, according to Hermann jahrreiss, 'a great
gain which we must not lose sight of again'.74 At the same time,
other supporters of the regime sought to exploit what they saw as the
strengths of the political ideas of the Third Reich in order to
fotmulate a new, distinctively National Socialist apptoach to the
international order. In part, this was a logical consequence of
Schmitt's warning at the end of the Weimar Repuhlic that a people
is first defeated when it subordinates itself to a foreign conception of
international law.75 If Germany were to escape this subordination,
then it had to formulate a distinctive, indigenous conception of
international law. The tension between these two approaches was
linked to other choices. Thus, attempts to exploit such principles as
the equaliry of states tended to appeal to those inclined to adopt a
statist perspective more generally. Attempts to emphasise a distinctive
ational Socialist approach tended to appeal to those inclined to
adopt a volkisch perspective. As in other areas of political thought
in the Third Reich, indeed even more so, uncertainry about the
final goals of the regime, compounded in this case by tactical
considerations, left scope for divergent interpretations and mutual
.. .
rectmunatlons.
Especially in the earlier years, relatively orthodox assertions were
still possible. Friedrich Wilhelm von Rauchhaupt bluntly stated: 'The
subject and object of international relations are fundamentally the
states recognised in international law'.76 The fact that Rauchhaupt
asserted that states without arms and honour do not qualify as
subjects of international law amounted to little more than a reformu-
lation of this basic principle, though the emphasis on arms and honour
clearly reflected the continuing resentment of the impositions of the
Versailles Treary.77 Gustav Walz defended the same principle as the
foundation of international law. He explicitly rejected 'monistic'
arguments that gave primacy to either domestic law or international
law in favour of a 'pluralistic' conception of international order. This
emphasis upon pluralism was, he claimed, wholly consistent with
National Socialist principles. It entailed a rejection of any form of
imperialism as well as the assumption that individuals or the 'totaliry
of individuals', that is, mankind, counted as subjects in inrernational
law. The only subjects of international law, he claimed, are 'national
[volkischI communities organised into stateS'.78
Hans Keller was not convinced that the full significance of the
National Socialist emphasis upon the Volk had been truly grasped.
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Walz had come close bur failed at the last hurdle because he allowed
the state to speak in the name ofthe Volk. 79 Just as Hohn had attacked
the concept of the state in general in the name of volkisch principles, so
too Keller attacked its use in international law. The idea of the
territorially defined state divorced from the Volk is, he argued, an
un-Germanic concept derived from the Italian renaissance and Roman
law and refined by French absolutism and the idea of the nation state
as developed in nineteenth-century France.so From this perspective,
insofar as international law exists, it does so on the basis of the
conception of law held by the various nations. As such, it extends so
far as these peoples share the same conception of law. According to
Nicolai, an exponent of an overtly racial approach to law, such
conceptions are rooted in the racial characteristics of peoples. From
this, he concluded that there can be no universally valid international
law, bur only a law shared by those of similar racial stock, In the case
of Germany, that meant an international community coextensive with
Nordic peoples. S1 Best's deductions from the volkisch principle did
not even allow for this. The overriding priority of the Volk is
compatible with a degree of 'regularity' but no more. Law is rooted
in the Volk, and there is nothing beneath the Volk and nothing above
the Volk in which law can be rooted. s2
The starkness of Best's position took no account of the lingering
conviction, which Heinrich Triepel still expressed, that the persistence
of power could only be ensured by some form oflaw.s3 Nor did ittake
account of the need to challenge alternative conceptions of interna-
tionallaw that might appeal to neutral powers in the event of war. It
was this that continued to concern Schmitt. Schmitt was still haunted
by Germany's defeat by the sea powers, that is, the British and the
Americans, in the First World War. Indeed, he sought to deploy his
assumptions abour the role of myth in politics to create a myth of sea
power through which he could discredit those aspects of international
law that he saw as a threat to Germany. The sea powers, he claimed,
are inherently imperialistic and reject tradition rooted in the experi-
ence of continental European land power whereby war is treated as a
duel between two states, neither of whom need be presumed to be
unjust by third parties who can remain neutral. It is typical that sea
power discriminates in the event of war, defining one of the parties as
unjust, as an enemy of mankind, who can, therefore, be pursued with
all ferocity.s4 Behind all this lay Schmitt's fear that America would
intervene in a European war as it had done in the First World War.
Schmitt's search for a new form of international law, his search for
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an alternative concept of political unity to that of the state and
his continuing hostility to the sea powers came together in his
Volkerrechtliche Grossraumordnung (The Order of Large Spaces in
International Law), first published in 1939. There, Schmitt noted that
in the autumn of 1937 he had not been able to specify what he wanted
to put in the place of the old concepts of international law. Now,
however, he had found an answer, without having to 'yield to the
concepts of the western democracies', namely the Reich.85 Each
Gro5sraum, or large region, would consist of a leading power, the
Reich, as well as several nations. The Reiche, Schmitt explained, 'are
the leading powers, whose political idea radiates through a specific
Gr05sraum and who specifically exclude the inre.rvention of alien
powers into this Grossraum'.86 With this principle of non-interven-
tion by powers alien to the Grossraum, Schmitt sought to turn the
ideas of the western democracies againsr them, for this principle is, he
claimed, that of the American Monroe doctrine.
Schmitt'S vision raised a number of awkward questions. Huber, who
was generally suppottive, worried that it might look too much like a
'''superstate'' '.87 Best, ever suspicious that Schmitt had not taken the
volkisch principle to heart, was concerned that Schmitt had conceded
too much to those nations subject to German hegemony - for, if the
Grossraumordnung was a system of international law, it was possible
that they might claim the right to negotiate treaties with the hegemonic
power or even the right to renounce their 'international legal ties with
the leading nation'.88 Hohn raised a host of objections, including the
idea that the principle of non-intervention was irself associated with the
'individualistic state', that is, the liberal state.89 Such responses were
reflecrions of more general differences ofemphasis as well as continuing
animosities. They were also bound up with persistent uncertainty about
the final destination and shape of a Europe dominated by National
Socialist Germany and the difficulty that supporters of that hegemony
had in conceiving of some structure and order without at least frag-
ments of the liberal discourse which they competed to disparage.
Political thought in the Third Reich was driven forward by this
competition to reject the concepts of the past, which were recognised
as part of the German past, if only to be disparaged as foreign
implants. Yet the peculiar lack of system, the proliferation of com-
peting agencies, the emergence of policies driven forward by those
'working towards the Fuhrer' still left room for dispute and for greater
or lesser adaptation to the racial visions for which the Third Reich,
and with it part of German political thought, would be condemned.
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